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"JUST THE FACTS, MA'AM": THE EFFECT OF THE
SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN FEIST
PUBLICATIONS, INC. v. RURAL TELEPHONE
SERVICE CO. ON THE COLORIZATION OF BLACK
AND WHITE FILMS
Michael F. Finn*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service
Co.(Feist),1 the Supreme Court held that the Intellectual Property
Clause of the United States Constitution2 requires that a work be
"original" to receive copyright protection.' Specifically, a white
pages telephone directory was found unworthy of copyright protec-
tion because it lacked the requisite level of "originality." 4
If read broadly, Feist withholds copyright protection from cer-
tain works that society has a clear interest in seeing created but do
not possess a sufficient amount of originality. In particular, Feist
may leave some colorized films5 without copyright protection. Al-
though colorizing films may clash with romantic notions of artistic
creation and integrity, this article will argue that such films should
remain worthy of copyright protection. Moreover, the large amounts
of time, effort, and expense involved in colorizing films and society's
* Michael F. Finn, B.S. 1988, with Honors, Indiana University; J.D. 1992, cum laude,
New York University School of Law. Former law clerk to the Honorable Conrad B. Duber-
stein, Chief Bankruptcy Judge for the Eastern District of New York. The author currently
works as a law clerk for the Honorable Frank M. Johnson, Jr., of the Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit.
My thanks to Professor Rochelle Dreyfuss of New York University and to my wife Ellen for
their invaluable comments and insight.
An earlier version of this paper received Second Prize in the ASCAP Nathan Burkan Memo-
rial Competition at New York University.
1. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991) thereinafter
Feist].
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
3. Id. at 1288 ("Originality is a constitutional requirement.").
4. Id. at 1297; see discussion infra part II.B.
5. Specifically, Feist may affect colorized versions of black and white films in the public
domain.
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demand for such films' may provide some support in favor of copy-
right protection of such works, even in the aftermath of Feist. With-
out protection against copying, industry efforts in film colorization
may be severely curtailed.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
A. Constitutional Basis for Copyright
Article I of the United States Constitution gives Congress the
power to "[p]romote the progress of science and useful arts, by secur-
ing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to
their respective writings and discoveries."' The premise of the Intel-
lectual Property Clause is twofold.' First, there is the implicit under-
standing that creative activity provides a public benefit.. Second,
there is the recognition that creative activity can be promoted and
maximized by offering individual authors an economic incentive to
create by way of the copyright monopoly, which serves as a reward
for past efforts and as an incentive to future endeavors.'0 While the
immediate effect of copyright law is to provide authors with a fair
return for their creative labor, the ultimate aim is to increase public
welfare by encouraging artistic creativity." The reward to the
owner, the copyright, is a secondary consideration;' 2 it is simply con-
sidered the best way to enhance the arts and sciences for the public
good. Without the public benefit, no justification exists to grant a
copyright monopoly."
Copyright protection is extended only to authors and their writ-
ings. 4 Under the Constitution, an "author" has been interpreted to
be "[h]e to whom anything owes its origin; originator, maker.""' Ac-
6. See discussion infra part III.A.
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
8. See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
1.03[A], at 1-44.14 (1992) [hereinafter NIMMER].
9. Id.
10. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
11. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); Computer
Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 696 (2d Cir. 1992); Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc.,
977 F.2d 1510, 1527 (9th Cir. 1992).
12. NIMMER, supra note 8, § 1.03[A], at 1-44.13; see Aiken, 422 U.S. at 156 (stating
that private motivation must ultimately serve to promote the public's access to literature, music
and other arts).
13. NIMMER, supra note 8, § 1.03[A], at 1-44.14.
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
15. Burrow-Giles Lithograph Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884); see also case cited
infra note 19.
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cording to Feist, originality, in addition to mere creation, is both con-
stitutionally and statutorily mandated; 6 a work must be the product
of the author's independent creation. 17
Courts have given a more expansive definition to the term
"writings," interpreting it to mean any tangible expression of the
author rather than being limited to words on paper. 8 As the Su-
preme Court stated in Goldstein v. California, writings include any
"physical rendering of the fruits of creative, intellectual, or aesthetic
labor.""9
B. The Feist Decision
In Feist, the Supreme Court examined whether copyright pro-
tection extended to the white pages of a phone directory. The parties
in the case included Feist Publications, Inc. (Feist), who manufac-
tured area-wide directories, and Rural Telephone Service Company
(Rural), a certified public utility acting as the sole provider of tele-
phone service to several communities in Kansas.2" In exchange for its
position, Rural was required by Kansas law to annually issue up-
dated telephone directories.21
The directory at issue was manufactured my Feist and con-
tained eleven different telephone service areas with approximately
47,000 listings as compared to 7,700 listings in Rural's directory.22
Rural declined to license its listings to Feist whereupon Feist copied
them from Rural without permission." Although Feist had employ-
ees independently confirm listings from Rural's directory, Feist still
16. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1288, 1290, 1292-94. The current Copyright Act explicitly states
the originality requirement by only conferring copyright protection to "original works of au-
thorship." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
17. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1287; Alfred Bell & Co. v Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99 (2d
Cir.), aft'd as modified, 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951); cf. L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536
F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1976) (deciding that slavish or mechanical copying is not original);
Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 305 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that "a derivative work
must be substantially different from the underlying work to be copyrightable.").
18. E.g., Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 58 (upholding copyright protection for photo-
graphs); see also 17 U.S.C. § 102 (defining general subject matter of copyright protection).
§ 102(a) of the Copyright Act protects "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, re-
produced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device."
19. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973). Additionally, it should be noted
that § 102(a)(6) of the Copyright Act defines "works of authorship" to include motion pic-
tures and other audiovisual works.
20. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1286.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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copied some 1,300 of Rural's listings, including four "dummy" list-
ings used by Rural to ascertain copying.24
In reaching its decision, the Court focused on the notion that
only original works of authorship are protected under copyright
law.2" The Court stated that originality is required by the Constitu-
tion, emphasizing the importance of this proposition by repeating it
at least seven times.26 Since facts are not original, the Court reasoned
that no copyright can subsist in bare facts.2" Further, the Court con-
cluded that the originality requirement cannot be met by showing
that significant labor has been expended in creating a work, which
clearly eliminates the "sweat of the brow doctrine" as a means to
gain copyright protection. 8 The Court noted that the only original-
ity that can be found in a collection of facts is in the selection, coor-
dination, or arrangement of those facts.29 Reading in the constitu-
tional requirement of originality, the Court stated that "[a]s a
constitutional matter, copyright protects only those constituent ele-
ments of a work that possess more than a de minimis quantum of
creativity. '"30
In applying this standard, the Court focused on the manner in
which the collected facts had been selected, coordinated and ar-
ranged."1 In scrutinizing the directory, the Court found it to be "a
garden-variety white pages directory."32 The use of an alphabetical
arrangement was considered to be nothing more than a common
practice that is "firmly rooted in tradition" and "does not possess the
minimal creative spark required by the Copyright Act and the
Constitution."33
C. Was the Constitutional Requirement Mandated?
Although the Court was clear in its belief that originality is
constitutionally mandated, many commentators are both surprised
and unhappy with the Feist decision.3 4 The Court's grant of certio-
24. Id. at 1286-87.
25. Id. at 1288.
26. Id. at 1288-89, 1296-97.
27. Id. at 1289.
28. Id. at 1292.
29. Id. at 1289.
30. Id. at 1297.
31. Id. at 1296-97.
32. Id. at 1296.
33. Id. at 1297.
34. See Jane C. Ginsburg, No "Sweat"? Copyright and Other Protection of Works of
Information After Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 338, 350 (March 1992)
[Vol. 33
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rari was not based on any constitutional issue. In general, the Court
strives to avoid basing its holdings upon constitutional grounds.3 5
Furthermore, Professor Marci Hamilton notes that the jurispruden-
tial approach of Justice O'Connor (who wrote the opinion for the
Court in Feist) is usually restrained-she will seek a narrow holding
rather than reach for a broader, constitutional one.36
In Feist, the Court need not have reached the constitutional
question, as several other options were available. The Court could
have justified the originality requirement as being grounded in the
Copyright Act. Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act states that copy-
right protection subsists in original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression." As Professor Paul Heald has noted,
the Court could have justified its holding solely on the basis that
telephone white pages are not "original works of authorship" within
the meaning of the Act.38 Additionally, the Court could have based
its decision on the fair use doctrine. 9 Under this doctrine, since Feist
copied only the names and addresses of Rural's customers, it appro-
priated nothing save for facts which belong in the public domain.
The use of these facts simply as a reference work could be considered
(asserting that Feist grossly neglects the incentive role of copyright); Paul J. Heald, The Vices
of Originality, 1991 SuP. CT. REV. 143, 155-60 (1992) (arguing that Feist may prevent Con-
gress from protecting "sweat of the brow" works which benefit the public welfare); Kristin
Loeber, Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co.: Mopping the Sweat Off the Brow, 44
BAYLOR L. REV. 409, 422-23 (1992) (suggesting that the result in Feist flies in the face of the
ultimate goal of copyright law-to facilitate the flow of information into the marketplace of
ideas); Philip H. Miller, Life After Feist: Facts, the First Amendment, and the Copyright
Status of Automated Databases, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 507, 521-23 (1991) (stating that Feist
jeopardizes incentives to create databases).
35. Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490, 526 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("Quite simply, it is not the habit of the
Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of
the case.") (quoting Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283, 295 (1905)).
36. Marci A. Hamilton, Justice O'Connor's Opinion in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Service Company: An Uncommon Though Characteristic Approach, 38 J. COPy-
RIGHT Soc. 83, 87 (1991); see also Webster, 492 U.S. at 525 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment) (stating that since "there was no conflict with any of
the Court's past decisions concerning state regulation of abortion, there was no necessity to
accept the State's invitation to reexamine the constitutional validity of Roe v. Wade.") (citation
omitted).
37. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988)
38. Heald, supra note 34, at 147; see also Sherry Mfg. Co. v. Towel King of Fla., Inc.
753 F.2d 1565 (11th Cir. 1985) (new design on beach towel was too trivial to be considered
original and hence unworthy of copyright protection).
39. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988) (stating that "the fair use of a copyrighted work ... is not
an infringement of copyright."); see also Harper & Row v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539
(1985).
1993]
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a fair use.' 0 That the Court rejected such approaches and instead
based its holding on the Constitution demonstrates the strength of
the Court's belief in the constitutional origins of the originality
requirement.
D. Historical Protection for Works of Labor
Feist essentially eradicates protection for works created from the
"sweat of the brow.""' Without protection, those who create a work
purely by labor will gain no monopoly rights. Consequently, there
exists little economic incentive to create such works. Thus, creators
may not spend time and energy creating labor-intensive works since
the works will immediately be available to free-riders who can copy
the work with little effort and destroy the market for the original
work."2
Because of these problems with incentives, before Feist, the
courts had long recognized the need to protect works created by in-
dustrious collection that benefit the general welfare. 4' This "sweat of
40. Heald, supra note 34, at 147; see Rockford Map Publishers, Inc. v. Directory Serv.
Co. of Colo., 768 F.2d 145, 149 (7th Cir. 1985).
41. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1292.
42. See William P. Farley, Industry Impact of Feist, in 'FACT' AND DATA PROTEC-
TION AFTER FEIST 41, 42 (Jon A. Baumgarten ed., 1991) (without protection, there will be
greater difficulty in justifying major investments in certain compilation works. Some useful
compilations will not be published); Heald, supra note 34, at 159 (the only way to stimulate
investments in labor and research may be to provide limited protection to the facts and infor-
mation thereby produced); Loeber, supra note 34, at 2 (individuals who would have
researched important factual materials may not choose to invest their time and labor in a
project which anyone may steal with impunity); see also Nash v. CBS, 899 F.2d 1537, 1542
(7th Cir. 1990) (there will be too few original investigations into history if all of the author's
work may be used without compensation); Miller v. Universal City Studio, 460 F. Supp. 984,
988 (S.D. Fla. 1978) rev'd, 650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981) (an author can not be expected to
expend time and money in gathering facts if he knows those facts and his profits may be
pirated away).
43. Professor Jane Ginsburg observes that as early as 1790, the First Congress protected
works which merely gather and report information by designating as copyright subject matter
not only books, but also maps and charts. Ginsburg, supra note 34, at 380 n.202. Courts have
found that copyright protection extends to maps and directories. E.g., United Tel. Co. v. John-
son Publishing Co., 855 F.2d 604, 607-09 (8th Cir. 1988) (telephone white pages directory);
Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co., 770 F.2d 128, 132 (8th Cir. 1985) (protecting
telephone white page directory); Rockford Map Publishers, Inc. v. Directory Serv. Co. of
Colo., 768 F.2d 145, 149-50 (7th Cir. 1985) (plat maps); Schroeder v. William Morrow &
Co., 566 F.2d 3, 6 (7th Cir. 1977) (gardening directory); Sampson & Murdoch Co. v. Seaver-
Radford Co., 140 F. 539, 542 (1st Cir. 1905) (city directory of Boston); Rand McNally v.
Fleet Mgmt. Systems 634 F. Supp. 604, 607 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (mileage date used in maps);
National Bus. Lists, Inc. v. Dunn & Bradstreet, Inc., 552 F. Supp. 89, 91-95 (N.D. Ill 1982)
(credit reports); c.f Amsterdam v. Triangle Publications, 93 F. Supp. 79 (E.D. Pa. 1950)
(finding that a map is copyrightable only if "the publisher of the map obtains originally some
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the brow" doctrine had its roots in a 1922 decision by the Second
Circuit wherein the Court stated that a copyright could be granted
on the basis of industrious collection.
The man who goes through the streets of a town and puts down
the names of each of the inhabitants, with their occupations and
their street number, acquires material of which he is the author.
He produces by his labor a meritorious composition, in which
he may obtain a copyright and thus obtain the exclusive right of
multiplying copies of his work. 4
In applying this standard, the court upheld a copyright given on a
compilation containing the trademarks of many jewelry companies
which the plaintiff had collected.43
Another famous example of the "sweat"- theory appears in Leon
v. Pacific Telephone. 6 The Leon court affirmed a finding of in-
fringement where the defendant had taken information from the
plaintiff's alphabetical directory and published it in a rearranged
form according to numerical order of the numbers. In upholding the
validity of the copyright, the court noted that creating a directory
requires large amounts of research, time, and money.47 By using the
addresses in the plaintiff's directory, the defendant's were attempting
to unlawfully appropriate the fruits of the plaintiff's labor and ex-
pense. 8 The -court reasoned that this appropriation deprived the
plaintiffs of the advantage of being able to publish their book at
much less labor and expense than others."9 However, the defendants
were free to publish their own directory as long as they received
their data through their own labor.5"
In the area of historical research, many courts felt ill at ease
with the "sweat of the brow" theory.61 Protection for such works
of that information by the sweat of his own brow").
44. Jeweler's Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co., 281 F. 83, 88 (2d
Cir. 1922).
45. Id.
46. Leon v. Pacific Tel., 91 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1937).
47. Id. at 485-86.
48. Id. at 487.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that historical
facts and theories may be copied); Miller v. Universal City Studios, 650 F.2d 1365, (5th Cir.
1981) (holding that historical research is not copyrightable); Hoehling v. Universal City Stu-
dios, 618 F.2d 972, (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that interpretive theories of history are not copy-
rightable); Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, 366 F.2d 303, (2d Cir. 1966) (holding that
historical facts and events are not copyrightable); Funkhouser v. Loews, Inc., 208 F.2d 185,
(8th Cir. 1954) (deciding that historical subject matter is in the public domain); Suid v. News-
1993]
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forced future researchers to go back to the author's original sources
and acted as a deterrent to later research. In effect, later historians
were being asked to recreate the wheel.52 In disregarding the "sweat
of the brow," these courts noted the special benefit that the public
receives from encouraging the development of historical and bio-
graphical works.5"
III. COLORIZED FILMS
A. Social Value and Mechanics of Colorized Films
To a large degree, modern audiences do not view black and
white films. 4 Thus, many works hailed as "works of genius" in
their day now languish in studio vaults.55 However, by colorizing the
film, the movie is able to reach out to a much larger audience and
captivate an entirely new generation of viewers.
The colorization process has been compared to "painting by
week Mag., 503 F. Supp. 146, (D.D.C. 1980) (deciding that historical research does not meet
the standard of originality).
52. Rosemont Enter., 366 F.2d at 310 ("We ... cannot subscribe to the view that an
author is absolutely precluded from saving time and effort by referring to and relying upon
prior published material. It is just such wasted effort that the proscription against the copy-
right of idea and facts ... [is] designed to prevent.").
53. Narell, 872 F.2d at 915 (noting that storytellers throughout time have used history
as source material for works of imagination); Hoehling, 618 F.2d at 974 ("IT] he protection
afforded the copyright holder has never extended to history ... The rationale for this doctrine
is that the cause of knowledge is best served when history is the common property of all, and
each generation remains free to draw upon the discoveries and insights of the past.");
Rosemont Enter., 366 F.2d at 307 (finding a strong public interest in encouraging historical
and factual works); Craft v. Kobler, 667 F. Supp. 120, 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that the
law will not enforce efforts to hoard, suppress, sell, or license historical fact). Contra Toksvig
v. Bruce Publishing Co., 181 F.2d 664, 667 (7th Cir. 1950) (protecting historical research into
the life of Hans Christian Andersen, where the author's research took over three years and
was based on interviews and documents that the author had to translate into English); Hol-
dredge v. Knight Publishing Corp., 214 F. Supp. 921, 923-24 (S.D. Cal. 1963) (protecting
extensive historical research); cf Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1542 (7th Cir. 1990)
(stating that Hoehling reduces the incentives to do historical research and will result in fewer
original investigations).
54. Black and white films are of little interest to a younger generation that has known
only color. David J. Kohs, Paint Your Wagon-Please: Colorization, Copyright, and the
Search for Moral Rights, 40 FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 5 (1988). The average movie audience has
rejected black and white films in favor of color. High-Tech Facelift for Film Classics, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Mar. 31, 1986, at 68. A recent poll shows 85% of viewers prefer
movies in color as opposed to black and white. Joseph W. Lazzaro, Color It Copyrighted:
Protection for Colorized Motion Pictures, 8 J.L. & COMM. 397, 415 (1988).
55. Elise K. Bader, A Film of a Different Color: Copyright and the Colorization of
Black and White Films, 36 COPYRIGHT L. SyMP. (ASCAP) 133, 134 (1990).
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numbers only with computer sophistication."56 First, the black and
white film is transferred to a videotape. Then, a computer electroni-
cally scans the first frame of a scene and separates the frame into
525,000 "pixels," 57 with each pixel representing a portion of the pic-
ture. In some instances, a sensing device is then used to read the
varying shades of black, white, and gray'and separate them into the
colors that were originally photographed." However, the color of
sets, make-up, and clothes were often chosen on the basis of what
would give the best rendition in black and white rather than the
colors that would have been used had the movie been filmed in
color.59 In these situations, the colorist must choose new colors by
assigning one of approximately 50,000 hues to each pixel.60
To ensure the historical accuracy of the colors, researchers ex-
amine archives, refer to old photographs, talk to the original direc-
tors and actors and even search for the original sets and clothing.61
Once the colorist has decided upon the proper hues for an entire
frame, the computer monitors and colors each object as it moves from
frame to frame until the scene changes at which point the process is
repeated for the next scene. 62 It can take several hours to colorize
even one minute of film6" at a cost ranging from $2,000 to $5,000.64
As shown, colorization is achieved through a largely mechani-
cal, labor-intensive process of discovering original colors or substitut-
ing those closest in spirit to the original by, for example, referring to
old photographs or talking with the original director. To ensure that
the proper colors are given to the computer, companies employ scores
of researchers to seek out information and color cues about films that
they intend to colorize.65
B. Background of Protection for Colorized Films
In 1987, the Copyright Office announced that it would grant
copyrights in colorized versions of black and white films as derivative
56. Kohs, supra note 54, at 4.
57. Michael C. Penn, Colorization of Films: Painting a Moustache on the "Mona
Lisa"?, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023, 1024 (1990).
58. Id. at 1024.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. The film's dialogue as well as costumes and other familiar objects may give clues
about the correct colors. Bader, supra note 55, at 141.
62. Penn, supra note 57, at 1024.
63. Id.
64. Lazzaro, supra note 54, at 400 n.23.
65. Bader, supra note 55, at 141.
19931
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works when created by the method previously described."' However,
in order to qualify for a derivative copyright, an existing work must
be modified in such a way as to be an original work of authorship.6"
In promulgating its decision, the Copyright Office stated that it
was a "close, narrow one,"6 and was based on the selections made
by the colorist.6" According to the Copyright Office, colorized films
can be copyrighted as derivative works if the following criteria are
met: (1) numerous color selections are made by human beings from
an extensive color inventory; (2) the range and extent of the new
colors represent more than a trivial variation; and (3) the overall
appearance of the motion picture is modified." As with all derivative
works, copyright extends only to the new material, which in the case
of colorized films is the color selection. 1
C. Colorization in the Aftermath of Feist
Although decided prior to Feist, the Copyright Office had stated
that colorization of films was worthy of copyright protection. A
broad reading of Feist, however, tends to nullify that conclusion.
While the Copyright Office based its decision to protect colorized
films on the original selection of color by the colorist, it also implic-
itly recognized the amount of labor involved.72 Feist, however, ex-
plicitly states that labor is not a proper justification upon which to
base copyright protection.7
According to Feist, a copyright may be granted where the selec-
66. Copyright Registration for Colorized Versions of Black and White Motion Pictures,
52 Fed. Reg. 23,443, 23,444-46 (1987) (noting that public comments preceding the Office's
decision supported copyright protection for computer-colored versions of black and white films
since they involve creative human authorship).
67. 17 U.S.C. § 101; see L. Batlin & Son v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490-91 (2d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976) (holding that derivative works must possess a distin-
guishable variation to be worthy of copyright); cf Saturday Evening Post v. Rumbleseat, 816
F.2d 1191, 1193 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating that a derivative work must have some incremental
originality). But cf. Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 301, 305 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding
that a derivative work must be "substantially different" from the underlying work to be
copyrightable).
68. 52 Fed. Reg. at 23,44637 C.F.R. part 202.
69. The Copyright Office stated that its decision was based on the allegation that the
typical colorized film is the result of the selection of 4000 colors drawn from a palette of 16
million colors. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. (deciding that the copyright will cover only the new material, the selection of
colors added to the original black-and-white film).
72. Id. at 23,444 (noting that colorists attempt to be faithful to the original coloring of
the actors and actresses involved).
73. Feist, 111 S.Ct. at 1292; see also supra part II.B.
[Vol. 33
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tion, coordination, and arrangement of facts is original.74 In other
words, the colorization must be creative independent of the underly-
ing motion picture. In most instances, colorization should meet this
standard.75 For each frame, choices of color must be made for a vari-
ety of items, including wardrobe, flesh-tone, furniture, and lighting.
The decisions involved in coloring a single frame containing only a
green tree involves choices not only of color tone but also of shade,
contrast, and depth. 71 Since the colors are selected from over sixteen
million palettes, 7 colorization should demonstrate sufficient original-
ity to qualify for copyright protection. 71
While a film colorized according to one's artistic taste should be
able to meet the selection, coordination, and arrangement criteria es-
poused by Feist, many colorized films strive for strict historical accu-
racy.79 By doing so, the range of color choices is severely curtailed,
thereby diminishing the selective choices made by the colorist.80 The
less selection and arrangement exhibited by the colorist, the more
difficult it is for a colorized film to meet the higher standard of origi-
nality required for derivative works.8" Furthermore, the Copyright
Office has stated that registration is not justified based on a claimed
C'arrangement' or 'combination' of the colors where the original
74. Feist, 111 S.Ct. at 1289.
75. Bader, supra note 55, at 148; Michael B. Landau, The Colorization of Black-and-
White Motion Pictures: A Grey Area in the Law, 22 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 1161, 1167, 1173
(1989).
76. Lazzaro, supra note 54, at 406.
77. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
78. For a post-Feist case which is analogous to colorizing, see Lipton v. Nature Co., 781
F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y 1992), wherein the court found that a valid copyright existed in a
portion of a book that contained a compilation of collective terms of venery (terms relating to
hunting and nature). The compilation was assembled by combining those terms in the public
domain with other venery terms that the author found by examining fifteenth century texts
and manuscripts and translating them into Modern English from Middle English. Id. at 1034.
The court noted that while considerable labor and research are not entitled to copyright pro-
tection, creative product and subjective selection are. Id. Thus, the court found that the compi-
lation was worthy of copyright protection since the author: (1) used his own judgment in terms
of selecting the venery terms for his book; (2) chose how to spell each term, and (3) arranged
the terms according to his own sense of their lyrical and poetical potential. Id.; see also, SAS
Institute, Inc. v. S & H Computer Sys., Inc., 605 F. Supp. 816, 827 (M.D. Tenn. 1985)
(finding a computer program demonstrated enough originality to sustain a valid copyright even
though the program was based upon another program that had entered the public domain).
79. Bader, supra note 55, at 139 n.29 (stating that the colorist's intent is to preserve the
spirit of old works in their original form). The Copyright Office was aware of this as well. See
supra note 166-71 and accompanying text.
80. Lazzaro, supra note 54, at 407 n.69 (noting that a film crew was sent to Macy's to
"see exactly" what color the granite was when preparing to colorize Miracle on 34th Street).
81. See supra note 67 and accompanying text for a discussion of the standard of origi-
nality for derivative works.
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black and white film predetermines the arrangement of the colors.''82
As shown, historical accuracy in color selection is nothing more
than the pursuit of public domain facts-the original colors-by the
colorist."' These facts are then "painted" onto the black and white
film via computer. 4 Since Feist prohibits protection for either facts
or labor,"8 and since there is no copyright in color per se,88 the only
basis for protecting colorized films would be for expression added by
the colorist. For those colorists striving to duplicate exactly the origi-
nal colors of a film through the use of public domain factual sources
and mechanical processes, no original expression is being added.8"
The greater the role of historical accuracy, the more the colorist re-
lies on factually determined colors. Thus, Feist would grant little or
no protection."
82. Copyright Registration for Colorized Versions of Black and White Motion Pictures,
52 Fed. Reg. 23,443, 23,446 (1987). In other words, the rationale behind the Copyright Of-
fice's decision to protect colorized films vanishes as the selection of colors is no longer up to the
colorist but instead relies on predetermined color facts, i.e., the actual colors used in the film.
This outcome is supported by those courts that refused to protect historical research. E.g.,
Miller v. Universal City Studios, 650 F.2d 1365, 1368-69 (5th Cir. 1981) (concluding that a
researcher is merely a discoverer of facts and has done nothing original); see supra text accom-
panying notes 51-53. However, colorized films differ from these "historical research" cases
because they are not works which are per se are about historical or biographical fact. In
general, those films sought to be colorized are those with the highest entertainment value. In
this regard, they seem closer in spirit to the reproduction cases such as Alfred Bell & Co. v.
Catalda Fine Arts 74 F. Supp. 973 (S.D.N.Y. 1947), affd as modified, 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir.
1951), where the court dealt with the reproduction of masterpieces in a method similar to
colorization and found that the copyright results from the skill and patience inherent in the
process in addition to the individual conception necessary to make the actual engraving. Id. at
975-76; see also Alva Studios v. Winninger, 177 F. Supp. 265, 266-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (find-
ing that the skill needed to produce a smaller exact version of Rodin's Hand of God sculpture
is properly considered in finding a valid copyright).
83. See supra text accompanying note 61.
84. The Copyright Office noted the mechanical nature of colorizing and stated that it
would reconsider its decision should the computer become more dominant in color selection. 52
Fed. Reg. at 23,446.
85. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1292; see also supra part II.B.
86. Color per se is a fact of nature and therefore is not copyrightable. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 202.1(a) (1991); Kitchens of Sara Lee v. Nifty Foods Corp., 266 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir.
1959) (colors belong to the public domain); Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 979 F.2d 242, 247
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (In considering whether a video game was copyrightable, the court did not
question the Register's position that coloring alone is per se not copyrightable.); Pantone, Inc.
v. A.I. Friedman, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 545, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (stating that the mere por-
trayal of color shades, standing alone, presents a doubtful case for copyright protection).
87. The use of the computer rules out any kind of accidental expression caused by "a
slip of the hand," which was sufficient to confer copyright in Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda
Fine Arts, 74 F. Supp. 973 (S.D.N.Y. 1947), aff'd as modified, 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951);
Bader, supra note 55 at 157; see supra note 82 and accompanying text.
88. Compare this with the situation in Uneeda Doll Co. v. Regent Baby Products, 355
F. Supp. 438, 441 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), in which the Copyright Office refused to grant a copy-
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Unless there is some original expression, no copyright could be
granted for the months of research and labor involved in locating the
original color scheme and transferring it onto the black and white
film. Without the benefit of the copyright monopoly, it is highly un-
likely that anyone would put forth the huge sums of money and time
needed to colorize films and make them interesting to a modern day
audience. In the absence of copyright, other entrepreneurs would be
free to appropriate and exploit the work for their own gain, effec-
tively destroying potential markets available to the creator. 9 Prior to
the Feist case, one court held that "[if a work has] merit and value
enough to be the object of piracy, it should also be of sufficient im-
portance to be entitled to protection."9
IV. METHODS OF PROTECTING COLORIZED FILMS
A. Use of the Commerce Clause
One method in which colorized films could be protected is
through Congressional regulation under the Commerce Clause.9"
Congress could pass legislation specifically preventing the copying of
colorized films, or it could legislate protection by barring the copying
of any work of intense labor and compilation.
However, the use of the Commerce Clause presents some diffi-
culties. According to Nimmer, no judicial or legislative authority ex-
ists which would allow such legislation by Congress.9" Additionally,
in Railway Labor Executors Ass'n v. Gibbons,98 the Court unani-
mously held that the Commerce Clause could not be used to make an
end-run around the Bankruptcy Clause's requirement of uniform
bankruptcy laws.9' It seems likely that the same rationale present in
Gibbons would also bar any type of Commerce Clause legislation
right to two similar but differently colored dolls. Holding to its belief that colors are not copy-
rightable, the Copyright Office registered only one of the dolls. Id.
89. See Kohs, supra note 54, at 20; James Thomas Duggan and Neil V. Pennella, The
Case for Copyrights in "Colorized" Versions Of Public Domain Feature Films, 34 J. Copy-
RIGHT Soc'y. 333, 345 (1987).
90. Henderson v. Tompkins, 60 F. 758, 765 (D. Mass. 1894).
91. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. For a more complete discussion of Congress's power
under the Commerce Clause and its relation to the Intellectual Property Clause, see Heald,
supra note 34, at 168-75.
92. NIMMER, supra note 8, § 1.90, at 1-60.
93. Railway Labor Ex'rs Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457 (1982).
94. Id. at 471 (refusing to permit Congress to allow employees of a bankrupt railroad to
receive payments from the railroad's estate in bankruptcy as this would remove from the Con-
stitution a limitation on Congress's power to enact bankruptcy laws).
1993]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
aimed at removing limitations of the Intellectual Property Clause.
B. State Action
Although Congress's power to protect colorized films may be in
doubt, state protection may be appropriate. Since originality is re-
quired by the federal Constitution, states may be able to legislate
protection for works considered "unoriginal" under Feist. In order to
do so, however, any state legislation must pass a federal preemption
examination ."
The recent decision in Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats9
concerning preemption under the federal patent system indicates that
state protection would be preempted. In Bonito Boats, Florida had
narrowly drawn a statute to prevent the reverse-engineering of boat
hulls by any direct molding process.9" The law was aimed at pro-
moting the creation of new boat hull designs by preventing copying
only through the most inexpensive method, the direct molding pro-
cess ." Although other forms of reproduction were acceptable under
the Florida law, the Court stated that this did not remove the stat-
ute's conflict with the federal scheme.99 Thus, the Court upheld the
invalidation of the statute since it provided protection without any of
the standards required by the patent law such as novelty or
usefulness."'
Additionally, Section 301 of the Copyright Act preempts all
state causes of action which grant rights equivalent to those in the
Copyright Act for subject matter covered by the Act. 01 In light of
the Bonito Boats ruling that the federal patent law preempts the
95. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
96. Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
97. Id. at 144-45.
98. Id. at 158-59.
99. Id. at 160.
100. Id. at 158-59.
101. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1988). For a full discussion of the effect of § 301 on state right
causes of action, see NIMMER, supra note 8, § 1.01[B] at 1-25 to 1-30; Ginsburg, supra note
34, at 355-61; Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the
Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 155 n.22 (1992) (stating that § 301 could be
applied to pre-empt state protection); see Baltimore Orioles v. Major League Baseball Players
Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663, 676 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding that § 301 prevents states from protecting
works which lack sufficient creativity because Congress has concluded such works should be in
the public domain); Mayer v. Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, 601 F. Supp. 1523 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(holding that conversion and misappropriation claims are preempted by Copyright law); Avco
Corp. v. Precision Air Parts 210 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 894 (M.D. Ala. 1980) (finding that misap-
propriation is pre-empted by § 301(a)), aff d on other grounds, 676 F.2d 494 (11th Cir.
1982).
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states from offering substantial protection to utilitarian and design
ideas unprotected by the patent laws and the preemptive powers of
Section 301 of the Copyright Act, it would seem that no matter how
carefully drawn, any state statute attempting to protect colorized
films would also be preempted.
C. Narrowly Reading Feist
Although the broad language of Feist seems to render both Con-
gress and the states powerless to protect colorized films, the courts
may be able to continue to protect such works by giving Feist a nar-
row reading. For example, extraordinary labor and skill could be
seen as evidence of creativity.10 2 Such evidence when coupled with
the colorist's selection and arrangement of color hues could constitute
original authorship.
Historically, there is nothing unusual about lower courts nar-
rowing broad intellectual property pronouncements by the Supreme
Court. For example, many commentators feared that the broad lan-
guage in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.' and Compco Corp.
v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc." 4 signaled the evisceration of design pro-
tection and heralded revolutionary changes in the copyright and un-
fair competition law.' 05 However, these feared outcomes never came
to pass, largely due to lower courts narrowly reading the Sears and
Compco Corp. decisions.' 0 6 Even today, lower courts continue to pro-
102. Allen-Myland v. IBM, 770 F. Supp. 1004, 1012 n.l (E.D. Pa. 1991). The idea
that labor can be indicative of creativity existed pre-Feist. See Alva Studios, Inc. v. Winninger,
177 F. Supp. 265, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (stating that copyright results from the skill and
originality used in producing an accurate scale reproduction of the original Rodin's Hand of
God Sculpture, becuase great skill and originality is called for when one seeks to produce a
scale reduction of great work with exactitude); Kuddle Toy, Inc. v. Pussycat Toy Co., 183
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 642, 658 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) ("The more the mezzotints in Bell v. Catalda
approached perfection of copying, the more brilliantly 'original' within their own special art of
copying. ... ).
103. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 228-30 (1964) (holding that
states may not prohibit the copying of unpatented and uncopyrighted articles).
104. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238 (1964) (holding that
states cannot enjoin the act of copying or selling unpatented or uncopyrighted products even if
the copied features are nonfunctional and not essential to the use of the article).
105. Professor Milton Handler thought that Sears and Compco Corp. presaged the dis-
carding of state unfair competition law. Milton Handler, Product Simulation, 64 COLUM. L.
REV. 1183, 1190 (1964). Similarly, Professor Walter Derenberg noted that at first glance,
Sears and Compco Corp. were tantamount to "[t]he roof [falling] in" on various precedents of
intellectual property law. Walter J. Derenberg, Product Simulation, 64 COLUM. L. REV.
1192, 1192 (1964). Professor Ralph S. Brown, Jr. believed that the Court had repudiated the
longstanding rule prohibiting the copying of an article's nonfunctional design features. Ralph
S. Brown, Jr., Product Simulation, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1216, 1220-21 (1964).
106. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 107.
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tect various works of aesthetic functionality despite the broad lan-
guage of Sears and Compco Corp. which allowed the copying of an
article's nonfunctional design.1"'
Just as the courts have declined to give a broad reading to Sears
and Compco Corp., many courts view the broad language in Feist as
simply acting as a brake on the expansion of copyright protection for
works of sweat. In particular, Feist is seen as overruling the result in
West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Central,'0 " which gave protec-
tion to West's page numbering of its reporters.' 9 Thus, while a first
glance at Feist indicates that it bars protection for works of sweat, in
practice, Feist's impact has been limited largely to works lacking
both creativity and sweat. In examining cases subsequent to Feist, it
seems that film colorization, like other works made by intensive la-
bor, should continue to receive copyright protection.
1. Computer Programs
In the arena of computer programs, the narrowing of the Feist
rationale is readily apparent. In Allen-Myland v. IBM, ° the court
examined the infringement of computer code. In finding the code to
be original, the court stated in a footnote that Feist does not render
107. W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 340, 342-43 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting in a
discussion of the functionality of a plastic stacking tray, that ornamental or fanciful shapes and
patterns are protected if nonfunctional); In re Morton-Norwich Products, Inc., 671 F.2d 1332,
1341-44 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (noting that since no evidence indicated that the specific design of the
spray bottle at issue was one of the best methods of design, it could not be said to be func-
tional); In re World's Finest Chocolate, Inc., 474 F.2d 1012 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (granting design
protection to a candy bar wrapper, despite its having structural or packaging functions, since
its primary purpose was to distinguish and identify the product). Like containers, buildings
have been granted trademark protection as long as problems of distinctiveness and functionality
can be overcome. Fotomat v. Cochran, 437 F. Supp 1231, 1236 (D. Kan. 1977) (holding that
despite serving functional purposes, Fotomat building is distinctive and constitutes valid service
mark).
108. West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Central, 799 F.2d 1219, 1227 (8th Cir. 1986)
(holding that LEXIS had infringed West's copyright in the arrangement of its cases by refer-
ring to West's page numbers in LEXIS cases), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1070 (1987).
109. See Harriette K. Dorsen, Compilations and Factual Narrative Works After Feist
Publication v. Rural Telephone Service, 317 PLI/PAT 401, Sept. 20, 1991, available in
WESTLAW, Journal and Law Review Database (questioning whether West's arrangement
would be sufficiently creative under Feist); Gordon, supra note 101, at 274 n.471 (stating that,
after Feist, the Eighth Circuit may have reached a different outcome and not found infringe-
ment); Heald, supra note 34 at 160-61 ("The 8th Circuit's decision in West Publishing Co. v.
Mead Data Central, Inc. is almost certainly a casualty of Feist."); Peter Jaszi, 505 and All
That-The Defendant's Dilemma, 55 SPG LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107 (1992) (stating
that Feist casts considerable doubt on the rationale of West).
110. Allen-Myland, Inc. v. IBM, 770 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
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effort "utterly irrelevant" in determining originality."' The court
held that evidence showing that the microcode required 1,500 person
years of effort was "probative . . . of the creative nature" of the
work." 2 The court also found that IBM's choices of whether and
how to use various computer code structures and arrangements
demonstrated sufficient intellectual labor and creativity." 8
In Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.," 4 the court nar-
rowed the Feist doctrine in its application of the "substantial similar-
ity" test of copyright infringement. "' The court held that "unpro-
tectible" elements should not be excluded from the substantial
similarity of expression analysis."' The court stated that if works
are deemed substantially similar, copyright infringement is estab-
lished even though the copyrighted work is composed of unpro-
tectible elements." 7 By doing so, the Court grants defacto protection
to the portions of a work that are undeserving of copyright. The
court reasoned that there can be no other logical way of protecting
an innovative arrangement or the "look" and "feel" of certain
works." 8
As far as computer programs are concerned, the use of labor as
an indication of creativity undoubtedly constricts the Feist deci-
sion." 9 Although labor cannot substitute for creativity, it seems that
if extensive skilled labor has been expended, courts may stretch to
find some creativity occurred as well. 2 ° Similarly, the use of unpro-
tectible elements in the infringement analysis assists someone who
has expended great effort in protecting her work even if much of the
work is actually unprotectible. By considering the sweat portions of a
work in an infringement analysis, courts provide some de facto pro-
tection to the sweat of one's brow.
111. Id. at 1012 n.1l.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1012.
114. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 779 F. Supp. 133 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
115. Id. at 135.
116. Id. at 136.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See J.H. Reichman, Electronic Information Tools-The Outer Edge of World In-
tellectual Property Law, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 797, 818 n.113 (1992) (stating that courts
are subtly circumscribing Feist and providing greater protection to computer data bases); Al-
len-Myland, Inc. v. IBM, 770 F. Supp. at 1012 n.1l.
120. See, e.g., Allen-Myland, Inc., 770 F. Supp at 1012 n.l 1. For a pre-Feist case with
a similar holding, see Alva Studios, Inc. v. Winninger, 177 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
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2. Yellow Pages Cases
While courts have continued to find white pages directories un-
original,' the outcome has been different with respect to yellow
pages. Subsequent to Feist, the Second Circuit has held that valid
copyrights exist in yellow pages directories.' 22 The Eleventh Circuit
had also reached the same conclusion in Bellsouth Advertising &
Publishing Corp. v. Donnelly. a decision later vacated and now
awaiting rehearing en banc.'23
In Key Publications v. Chinatown Today Publishing Enter-
prises,"4 the originality of yellow pages directories aimed at Chi-
nese-Americans was questioned. Key Publications ("Key") had col-
lected business cards from those establishments which it felt would
be of interest to Chinese-Americans and had sorted them into one of
260 categories with a total of 9,000 listings.' 25 The defendant's di-
rectory contains approximately 2,000 listings spread among 28 cate-
gories, of which 1,500 were also listed in the Key directory.'
The court stated that the directory met the minimal levels of
originality 27 and noted that copyright would hinge on the selection
and arrangement of the data.' 28 Regarding selection, the court found
that "thought and creativity" went into the selection of businesses
121. E.g.,Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Haines & Co., 932 F.2d 610, 611 (7th Cir. 1991)
(following the decision in Feist).
122. See infra text accompanying notes 124-32.
123. Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publishing, 933 F.2d
952 (11th Cir. 1991), reh'g granted and opinion vacated, 977 F.2d 1435 (11th Cir. 1992). In
upholding the copyright in a yellow pages directory, the panel noted that several acts of selec-
tion by Bellsouth rendered the directory "original." Id. at 958. Such acts included the follow-
ing: deciding which geographic areas would be included, choosing a "close date" after which
no more listings would be accepted, creating and picking which business classifications would
be included, coordinating the informational components of a particular business into a com-
plete business listing, and arranging these listings into the various categories. Id. at 957-58.
Thus, the panel held that the yellow pages were "sufficiently distinct" from the white pages in
Feist and were "original." Id. at 958.
Two categories of originality in Bellsouth seem to resurrect the "sweat" doctrine: the coordi-
nating of a company with its name and phone number and the placing of the company alpha-
betically into its heading or category. These acts are nothing but pure labor. Further, the court
rejected attempts to evaluate the originality of each element individually, stating "each compo-
nent must not be evaluated in a literary vacuum but as an integral part of the whole." Id. at
959 n.18; see supra text accompanying notes 114-18.
124. Key Publications v. Chinatown Today Publishing Enters., 945 F.2d 509 (2d Cir.
1991).
125. Id. at 511.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 512-13 (stating that "original means not copied and exhibiting a minimal
amount of creativity," which means a prohibition on actual copying).
128. Id. at 513.
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since Key excluded those businesses which it felt "would not remain
open for very long, such as insurance brokers and take-out restau-
rants, and traditional Chinese medical practitioners. '129 Similarly,
the court found that the arrangement was not mechanical, but that it
involved creativity, as Key decided which categories to include and
under what name.' ° Thus, the copyright was valid. 3' However, the
court found that no infringement had occurred by only comparing
protected elements in the substantial similarity analysis.13
Despite the narrow infringement analysis employed by the Sec-
ond Circuit, its decision can still be seen as a narrowing of the Feist
doctrine.' 33 In most respects, there is little difference between the
yellow and white pages directories. 1 3  Both involve decisions about
geographic limitations and closing dates. Both use alphabetical or-
der-the white pages by last name, the yellow pages by product cat-
egory and then by business within the category. Both also arrange
listings in the "garden variety" manner of name, address, and phone
129. Id.
130. Id. at 514.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 514-16. Unlike those courts whose infringement analysis assists in protecting
works of labor by including unprotectible elements,see supra text accompanying notes 114-18,
the Second Circuit examined substantial similarity between only those elements which provide
copyrightability to the infringed work. Key Publications, 945 F.2d at 514-16. Hence, the court
examined only the selection or arrangement of the listings, stating that to hold otherwise would
bring back the "sweat" doctrine and give a defacto copyright to the facts. Id. at 516. Thus,
the defendants were free to copy the listings in the Key directory as long as they were operat-
ing under different principles of selection. Id. Since the defendants did not duplicate in total
any of the categories, the court decided that there was no infringement. Id. at 517.
133. See Heald, supra note 34, at 161-62 (stating that Feist appears to jeopardize the
protection for yellow pages). The original decision of the Eleventh Circuit panel to uphold the
copyright in yellow pages certainly constricted the decision in Feist. Professor Ginsburg had
characterized Bellsouth as demonstrating the Eleventh Circuit's resistance to the abolition of
sweat-based copyright. Ginsburg, supra note 34, at 352. Others have described Bellsouth as a
subtle and ingenious effort to circumvent Feist. Reichman, supra note 119, at 818 n.113.
Whether or not the Bellsouth decision is dead will depend on the rehearing of the case en
banc. It may very well be that the other members of the Circuit agreed with the rationale
behind granting copyright to yellow pages directories, but did not agree with the panel's test of
substantial similarity, which allowed the court to scrutinize all elements of the work, including
those produced by "sweat," and ultimately resulted in a decision of infringement by the de-
fendant. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
134. See Howard B. Abrams, Originality and Creativity in Copyright Law, 55 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 37-39 (1992) (providing a reasonably persuasive case that yellow pages
lack creativity). See generally Michael A. Epstein, Protection of Databases Under U.S Copy-
right Law: Feist and its Progeny, 7 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 2, (1992) (stating that it is hard to
find any creativity in a yellow pages directory not displayed in Feist). But see John J.
Voortman, Copyrighting Parts Books: The Protection of Parts Information as Industriously
Collected or Compiled Data, 10 J.L. & COM. 219, 243-46 (discussing the distinct differences
between white and yellow pages directories).
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number.
The directories differ only in the use of business headings and
in the amount of labor expended in compiling the listings. Although
Key Publications emphasizes that the choice of headings and the se-
lection of listings within each heading constitute originality," 5 Pro-
fessor Heald has pointed out that almost all yellow pages adhere to a
standardized format proposed by the National Yellow Pages Service
Organization." 6 Thus, the choice of business headings would seem
to be quite limited and "garden variety.' 7 As to the selection of
listings, it would seem that the idea and the expression of many such
listings would be merged. 38 For example, there are only so many
ways to express such things as boat repair or hair cutting, such as
boat mechanic, nautical repair, barber, salon, beauty parlor.' 9
The only real difference between the yellow and white pages
directories is the amount of labor expended in creating them. Unlike
Rural in the Feist case, which simply reproduced its subscriber list
into a white pages directory,140 Key expended labor in creating its
work by locating, soliciting, and compiling advertisers for its yellow
pages directories." Given that the only true difference between the
directories is in the labor expended in soliciting listings, the uphold-
ing of the copyright in yellow pages demonstrates that courts con-
tinue to be influenced by the amount of labor involved in creating a
135. Key Publications, 945 F.2d at 513-14.
136. Heald, supra note 34, at 162; see also Ginsburg, supra note 34, at 5 (In order to
make yellow pages user-friendly, the number of possible combinations of classifications are
decreased, thereby reducing the opportunities for creativity.).
137. Heald notes that the format of yellow pages directories would seem to be unpro-
tectible as a practice "firmly rooted in tradition and so commonplace that it has come to be
expected as a matter of course." Heald supra note 34, quoting Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1297; see
Warren Publishing v. Microdos Data Corp., No. CIV.A.I: 90-CV-1654J, 1992 WL 235745,
at *9 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 1992) (stating that since the type of information desired by subscrib-
ers to publications on the cable industry are fairly standard, the selection of the data fields to
be published does not have enough creativity to warrant protection, because the data fields are
obvious).
138. In copyright, the doctrine of idea-expression merger prevents copyright protection
for the expression of an idea if the idea can only be expressed in a very limited number of
ways. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967) (finding
that a sweepstakes entry form has limited number of expressions); Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry
Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971) (finding that the idea of a jeweled bee pin
merges with expression).
139. See American Direct Mktg., Inc. v. Azad Int'l, Inc., 783 F. Supp. 84, 95
(E.D.N.Y. 1992) (expressing that the dangers of tooth plaque are merged with the idea).
140. In return for the monopoly rights to local phone service, Rural was required to
compile and produce a white pages directory. To do so, it simply reproduced its customer
records. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1286.
141. Key Publications, 945 F.2d at 513.
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work and, therefore, are willing to stretch their understanding of
"creativity" to acknowledgement of that work.142
3. Charts and Tables
In Armond Budish v. Harley Gordon,'43 Judge Alice M.
Batchelder granted a preliminary injunction against a defendant who
copied certain tables regarding Medicaid from the plaintiff's book."
The plaintiff had created his tables by culling and rearranging data
and footnotes from a lengthy and cumbersome government report to-
gether with information compiled from other sources.'14  Although
the facts were all in the public domain, the court agreed with the
plaintiff that the defendant had impermissibly copied its facts from
the plaintiffs book.' 6
In effect, the outcome is the same as that which would occur
under a "sweat of the brow" test. Under the "sweat" doctrine, the
copyright would be upheld as a reward for the labor expended in
sifting through and rearranging the government report. Post-Feist,
the court upholds the copyright on the basis of the author's original
selection and arrangement of data, all of which was compiled from
public domain sources.' 4 7 This selection and arrangement is tanta-
mount to "labor" under the old doctrine and "creativity" or "origi-
nality" under the new doctrine. It seems that all the plaintiff did was
to choose specific data and arrange it in a more user-friendly fashion.
Such actions are not generally considered creative. 4
In another recent case involving charts, Kregos v. Associated
Press,49 the Second Circuit reversed a summary judgment finding
142. Most commentators believe that yellow pages directories exhibit no extra creativity
as compared to white pages. See supra text accompanying notes 133-37. Depending on the
outcome of the rehearing in Bellsouth, the Eleventh Circuit may be in disagreement with these
commentators. See supra note 123.
143. Armond Budish v. Harley Gordon, 784 F. Supp. 1320, (N.D. Ohio 1992).
144. Id. at 1338.
145. For example, the author winnowed through hundreds of information categories
and chose eight for one of his tables. Another table was created by discarding nine of seventeen
categories. Id. at 1324-27, 1333.
146. Id. at 1337.
147. See id. at 1332-33. Budish relied on information in government reports. Id. at
1326.
148. See Matthew Bender & Co. v. Kluwer Law Book Publishers, 672 F. Supp. 107,
108, 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that a 635 page chapter in a nine-volume treatise on tort
awards organized alphabetically by body part, state, and adequacy of the reward, was insuffi-
ciently original to be creative because the ways in which the material could be arranged so as
to be useful to the practitioner were very limited).
149. Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1991).
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that no copyright could subsist in plaintiff's baseball pitching
form.1"' The Second Circuit found that the plaintiff's form contained
enough selectivity to satisfy the requirement of originality because
the plaintiff chose nine specific categories out of "scores of available
statistics."' '1 In examining the form's arrangement, the court held
that it was a "garden-variety" pitching form since the statistics were
organized into columns and grouped in the same manner as most
other forms. 15' Thus, the court held that the only potentially pro-
tectible element is the selectivity of the statistics, which the plaintiff
is entitled to test at trial.1 53
Like Armand Budish, the chart in Kregos is compiled by gath-
ering public information and rearranging it to make it more appeal-
ing and useful to the public. Under the "sweat" doctrine, labor be-
stowing a benefit upon society is deserving of protection. 54 In truth,
the plaintiffs merely winnowed through various public domain facts
and emerged with their own charts. Referring to this as "original" is
simply the language of "sweat" couched in new terms."'
The Second Circuit's invalidation of a racing chart in Victor
Lalli Enterprises, v. Big Red Apple, Inc.'56 is not inconsistent with
the idea that certain labor intensive works deserve protection.
Rather, the decision is consistent with the view that works involving
no real labor such as West's pagination efforts deserve no protec-
tion.' 57 Thus, in Victor Lalli Enterprises, the court refused to grant
protection to a chart created by subjecting public domain numbers to
150. Id. at 702, 711. But see Victor Lalli Enters. v. Big Red Apple, 936 F.2d 671, 672-
74 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding that racing forms compiled by simple rearranging of data are not
original); cf Project Dev. Group v. O.H. Materials Corp., 766 F. Supp. 1348, 1353-54 (W.D.
Penn. 1991) (finding no originality in construction bids created by filling in a general form).
151. Kregos, 937 F.2d at 704-05.
152. Id. at 709.
153. Id. at 709-10.
154. See discussion supra part II.D (discussing protection given under the "sweat of the
brow" doctrine).
155. Since Kregos is seen as an ingenious effort to limit Feist, Reichman, supra note
119, at 818 n.113, it is not surprising that the court in Kregos reaches the same conclusion that
it would have under a "sweat" analysis, albeit through different terminology.
156. Victor Lalli Enters. v. Big Red Apple, 936 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1991).
157. It should be noted that West's pagination efforts received protection from the
Eighth Circuit. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text. However, as noted previously,
many commentators believe that the Court in Feist intended to brake the expansion of copy-
right protection by leaving works of such minor effort unprotected. See, e.g., Gordon, supra
note 101, at 154 (Feist may check the expansive willingness of courts); Reichman, supra note
119, at 805 n.38 (It remains to be seen if Feist checks the budding expansionist treatment of
derivative factual works.). In other words, it is one thing to create a map or solicit advertising
for a yellow pages but quite another to simply mark pages in numerical order.
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a simple mathematical format. 5 ' The court noted that all publishers
of the charts used the same format that the information was "derived
from commonly ascertainable external sources." '159 Thus, since the
publishers exercised no independent judgment, there was no reason
to grant copyright protection.' 60
4. Books
In Warren Publishing Inc. v. Microdos Data Corp., 6' the
plaintiff published a national directory of cable systems in alphabeti-
cal order by state. Although this method of arrangement was stan-
dard practice within the trade, the plaintiff argued that its method of
defining a cable system was unique-the plaintiff defined a cable
system as being composed of one or more residential communities
where a cable company offers the same service at the same price.'
After defining the cable systems, the plaintiff determined the princi-
pal community for each cable system by asking the cable companies
for their major residential community.' 63 The plaintiff then pub-
lished its cable guide by listing other communities within a cable
system alphabetically following their principal community.' 6 ' The
court found this selection to be original and held that the defendant's
use of these same cable systems in a database infringed the plaintiff's
copyright.' 65
In Lipton v. Nature Co., the court again used "selection" as a
term of art to replace "labor."' 66 The plaintiff had written a book
that used seventy-six "terms of venery" (collective terms relating to
nature and hunting).'67 The defendant sold hunting equipment im-
printed with seventy-three words or "multitudes," of which seventy-
two were exact replications of the plaintiff's terms of venery.' 8 In
making its preliminary findings, the court noted that while some of
158. Victor Lalli Enters., 936 F.2d at 672-73.
159. Id. at 672.
160. Id. at 673.
161. Warren Publishing, Inc. v. Microdos Data Corp., No. 1:90-CV-1654-JOF, 1992
WL 235745 (N.D. Ga. March 31, 1992).
162. Id. at *4.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at *7.
166. Lipton v. Nature Co., 781 F. Supp. 1032, 1034-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (deciding that
the plaintiff's compilation of terms was copyrightable and dismissing defendant's Rule 19 and
forum non conveniens motion).
167. Id. at 1033.
168. Id.
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the terms in plaintiff's compilation are known and in the public do-
main, many others were creatively interpreted from Middle English
and are products of plaintiff's imagination.169 The plaintiff used his
own judgment in selecting and arranging the terms based on such
factors as their "lyrical and poetic potential" and their "fluidity of
language.'17 0 The court noted that while considerable labor would
not be enough to merit copyright protection, the plaintiff's actions
appeared to render the work copyrightable.17'
A similar use of judgment by the plaintiff is seen in another
unpublished opinion, NADA Services Corp. v. CCC Information
Services, Inc.'12 The plaintiff publishes an Official Guide to Used
Cars that is created by gathering sales information from around the
country.' 7 The company then chooses a "benchmark car" for every
model which forms the basis for pricing all other models of that
car. 7 ' The price is derived from comparing statistical data, analyz-
ing the economy and market trends, and the company's own judg-
ment.17 ' The court noted the great expense and labor involved in
collecting the data and even recognized that individual judgment is
called upon.' 7 6 However, since the NADA Guide is marketed as
containing "average values based on actual transactions," the court
found the evidence of creativity to be mixed. 17 7 While the court ac-
knowledged that the company had some likelihood of proving at trial
that these prices are original, it refused to grant a preliminary in-
junction against the defendant's copying as the equities favored the
defendant.' 7 8
Much like the cases involving charts, these book cases deal with
information gathered from the public domain and reshaped to be
more appealing and useful to the public. That a court can suggest
that picking a principal community or choosing a benchmark car is
original signals that courts seem to be substituting the language of
"selection" and "arrangement" for that of "sweat" and "labor."
169. Id. at 1034.
170. Id.
171. id.
172. NADA Servs. Corp. v. CCC Info. Servs., Inc., No. 91 C 4593, 1991 WL 287961
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 15, 1991).
173. Id. at *1.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at *1.
177. Id. at *3.
178. Id. at *3-5.
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5. Designs and Sculptures
In Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer California,""9 the court ex-
amined the issue of whether a pattern of roses placed in straight
lines and facing various directions was copyrightable. 80 The ar-
rangement was created by cutting out photocopies of the rose and
pasting them over a background.'' Since the background had been
copied from public domain sources, it was unoriginal.' However,
the arrangement of roses did possess some minimal standard of crea-
tivity in that the artist decided to place them in straight rows. 8" The
court found no evidence that the decision to place the roses in rows
was copied from any other source. " In holding the work copyright-
able, the court stated that while the work required little creative in-
put, it was still original to the plaintiff.' Thus, protection was war-
ranted for both the rose and the arrangement of roses.'86 However,
infringement did not exist as there was evidence that the design was
arrived at independently.'8 7
In Folio Impressions, the court protects a design which seems as
garden variety as the placing of names in alphabetical order. The
court did so despite recognizing that copyright protects neither the
idea of placing roses in straight lines nor the idea of a rose itself.'
Although the court says that copyright will protect the particular
rose placed in a straight line, this is a peculiar statement since the
court also states that "by the rose's very nature, one artist's render-
ing of it will closely resemble another artist's work."' 89 Thus, since
roses tend to look alike and since there is no protection for straight
line arrangements, it seems that the work should fall outside of copy-
right protection. That it does not indicates that courts are indeed
being influenced by artistic labor as a means of earning copyright
179. Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer California, 937 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1991). But see
Homer Laughlin China Co. v. Oman, No. 90-3160, 1991 WL 154540 (D.D.C. July 30,
1991) (rejecting the plaintiff's contention that commercial success, expense, human effort, pro-
fessional skills, and artistic recognition qualify the design for a copyright and instead uphold-
ing the Register of Copyright's refusal to register a chinaware design pattern which combined
simple geometric shapes into one design).
180. Folio Impressions, 937 F.2d at 761.
181. Id. at 763-64.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 765.
184. Id.
185. d.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 766.
188. Id. at 765.
189. Id. at 766.
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protection.
D. Revisiting Protection for Colorized Films
As long as courts narrowly construe the Feist decision, colorized
films should continue to receive copyright protection.19 For those
artists who base their selection of colors on personal taste or reasons
other than factual accuracy, colorized films should be able to demon-
strate the requisite level of originality.19 ' Ample case law exists for
this conclusion because color selection is no less original than choos-
ing a principal community, adopting geographical or date limita-
tions, picking data from government social security tables, or arrang-
ing roses in a straight line.'9 2
For those films colorized according to historical accuracy, copy-
right protection poses a more difficult question. Unlike the mezzo-
tints in Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 9 ' the use of com-
puters precludes any originality based on "defective musculature or
shocks caused by claps of thunder."' 9 " However, this does not mean
that copyright protection cannot subsist in these works. Protection
could be available under the rationale of Alva Studios v. Winninger
and Allen-Myland v. IBM' in which courts recognize that creativ-
ity may be evidenced by prolonged, highly skilled labor. In other
words, over the length of time needed to colorize a film, some crea-
tivity must occur. This argument is bolstered by realizing that
human beings are by nature imperfect. Therefore, it would be im-
possible for a human colorist to duplicate exactly the original colors
of a film. No matter how hard one tries, the resulting film will re-
flect selections individually chosen by the colorist, even if by accident.
Other commentators would argue that copyright is justified
since colorized films bestow a unique public benefit in terms of in-
creased access to inaccessible works.'9 6 Much like the reproduction
190. As noted previously, many commentators believe that Feist was intended to check
the expansion of copyright to include numerical paging or alphabetical order. See supra notes
108-09 and accompanying text. As such, it is not improper to construe Feist narrowly.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 56-64.
192. See supra part IV.C.
193. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
194. Id. at 105; see discussion supra note 82. With a computer, it is possible to correct
any errors of this nature that might occur.
195. See cases cited supra note 102.
196. See Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J.
COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 209, 212 (1983) (arguing that copyright in art reproductions is justified
due to the public benefit of increased access to otherwise inaccessible works). Heald, supra
note 34, at 163 (discussing post-Feist protection for maps and concluding that since the framers
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of the Rodin sculpture in Alva Studios, colorized films bring inacces-
sible works to the public eye. To deny copyright protection to these
films would force colorists to "add something" in order for their
work to be perceived as original.' 97 This would not only increase the
costs of the work, 198 but it would also deprive audiences from seeing
a colorized film that remains true to its original. Further, allowing a
copyright in colorized films will not result in decreased access to in-
formation which courts with historical research feared;' 99 the "color"
would actually result in increased public interest and access. 200
Therefore, granting copyright to colorized films based on historical
fact does not impact upon the greater need to disseminate factual
works as compared to works of fiction or fantasy;2 ' the original
black and white film remains in the public domain and the new ver-
sion is protected only to the extent of the colors chosen.20 2
V. CONCLUSION
As shown, the most feasible and logical technique for protecting
colorized films is to continue to read Feist narrowly. The aftermath
of the Sears and Compco Corp. cases203 demonstrates that historical
precedent exists for lower courts constricting broad intellectual prop-
erty declarations by the Supreme Court. Given the apparent narrow-
ing of the Feist decision by the lower courts, it seems that this prece-
dent is being followed and that colorized films remain eligible for
of the Constitution specifically intended to protect maps, the decision in Feist regarding the
unavailability of sweat-based protection is therefore suspect). Moreover, had the court not pro-
tected the reproduction in Alva Studios, there would be no incentive to reproduce such works.
Consequently, reproductions of sculptures would be hindered, thereby limiting the public ben-
efit of the sculpture to those members of the public who could journey to its actual site.
Clearly, the policy considerations in Alva Studios are present with respect to colorized films.
197. Ginsburg, supra note 34, at 347 (to sustain copyright, compilers will be forced to
add " 'original' content" to their work in order to justify copyright).
198. Id.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 51-53.
200. Films are colorized with the idea of presenting them to the public for viewing,
thereby earning profits. In order to achieve this goal, the colorist will need to release the new
version as a television or studio film, or sell the film to secondary markets such as videocassette
stores. In any event, the net result is increased public access.
201. Penelope v. Brown, 792 F. Supp. 132, 137 (D. Mass. 1992) (quoting Harper &
Row v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563). Additionally, it may be argued that colorized films
are closer in spirit to works of fiction or fantasy because the films most in demand to be
colorized are of this exact nature, i.e., fiction.
202. Thus, a person could theoretically take the public domain version and then color it
to his or her own tastes or simply view the colorized version and then choose out of the mil-
lions of palettes whatever colors she finds most appealing.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 103-07.
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copyright protection. For most colorized films, the color selections
made by artists can be seen as their personal expression, which
should meet the standard of originality required for derivative works
under Feist. For those films which strive for historical accuracy, the
outcome should be no less certain. Evidence of creativity can be
found in the tremendous skill and labor involved. The recognition of
their social value and the acknowledgment that without incentives
such works will not be created also adds to the argument in favor of
protection.
By construing Feist as a retreat from the highly criticized deci-
sion in West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Central,20" courts allow
authors the incentive to continue to create works involving minimal
originality, high labor costs, and great social benefits which will not
otherwise be created. In doing so, the courts benefit the public wel-
fare and effectuate the underlying policy of copyright protection.
Harkening back to the twin bases of copyright law, protecting
colorized films, even those colorized according to historical fact, re-
wards the artist for his creative efforts and more importantly, fur-
thers the promotion of the arts by breathing new life into black and
white films which have been all but abandoned by modern day
audiences.
204. West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Central, 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1070 (1987).
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